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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MOBILITY IN THE 1990s
ABSTRACT
This paper surveys the performance of international capital markets and the literature
on measuring international capital mobility. Three main functions of a globally integrated
and efficient world capital market provide focal points for the analysis. First, asset-price
arbitrage ensures that people in different countries face identical prices for a given asset.
Second,tothe extent that the usual market failures allow, people in different countries can
pooi risks to their lifetime consumption profiles. Third, new saving, regardless of its country
of origin, is allocated toward the world's most productive investment opportunities. The
paper evaluates the international capital market's performance of these roles by studying data
on international interest-rate differences, international consumption correlations, international
portfolio diversification, and the relations between national saving and investment rates. The
conclusion is that while international capital mobility has increased markedly in the last two
decades, international capital movements remain less free than iniranational movements, even






and NBEROver the past two decades, global trade in financial assets has been
spurred by advances in communication and transaction technologies, by the
creation of new financial products, and by a widespread trend toward
deregulation of domestic and international capital—market activities. In
almost all respects, the consequences of these developments remain
controversial.
1
In theory the potential benefits of international capital mobility
are clear: individuals gain the opportunity to smooth consumption by
borrowing or diversifying abroad, while world savings are directed to the
world's most productive investment opportunities. The size of these
gains, and the extent to which they are being attained in practice,
remains uncertain and furnishes an active area for research. Answers are
needed urgently: high on the policy agenda in a number of countries is a
choice between further integration into world or regional capital markets
and the retention of traditional macroeconomic policy options.
This paper surveys the performance of international capital markets
and the literature on measuring international capital mobility. Section 1
reviews the main functions and implications of capital mobility. Section
2 examines recent evidence on the world capital market's ability to
arbitrage the prices of similar assets. The market's record in allowing
countries to diversify risks is taken up in section 3. Section 4 focuses
on interpreting divergences between national saving and domestic
investment rates. Section 5 concludes.
'An excellent overview of theexpanding range of international financial
markets is contained in Goldstein et al. (1993).1. Free international capital mobility: Definition and implications
Capital is freely mobile within a multi-country region when its
residents face no official obstacles to the negotiation and execution of
financial trades anywhere and with anyone within the region, and face
transaction costs that are no greater for parties residing in different
countries than for parties residing in the same country. The definition
implies that national authorities do not interpose themselves between
transaction partners from different countries, other than through the
provision of a nationality—blind legal framework for contract
enforcement.
Actual conditions may differ from this ideal of free international
capital mobility. Governments can impose taxes on cross-border financial
flows and payments, including certain types of reserve requirement, as
well as quantitative limits and outright prohibitions. The mere threat of
such measures can discourage international capital movement, as can
official "moral" suasion in which threats of formal regulation may be
implicit. The prospect of partial or full government expropriation of
foreign-owned assets lowers the financial openness of some economies.
Differences in language and business practice can raise the cost of an
international financial deal relative to that of a similar deal between
residents of the same country.
In measuring the strength of such barriers to international capital
movement, an essential comparative benchmark is the ideal case of perfect
international capital mobility, in which capital is free to move
internationally and transaction costs literally are zero. This section
therefore reviews the main implications of perfect capital mobility,
2implications that will be compared with recent experience in the sections
to follow. A main theme of the paper is that such comparisons are seldom
straightforward: many commonly used barometers of capital mobility are
based on strong, often questionable, auxiliary assumptions about the
world.
The law of one price
Perhaps the most basic implication of perfect capital mobility is
that an asset's price must be the same wherever it is sold. With
sufficiently detailed data it would be possible to test this implication
directly on a wide array of assets. In practice, however, most tests of
the law of one price compare the prices in different localities of a
narrow set of closely comparable assets, namely, claims on specified
future currency payments.
The dollar price of $1 to be delivered in country A one period from
today is l/(l+i), whereis the one-period nominal dollar interest
rate in country A. In country B on the same date, the nominal dollar
interest rate is L. Under perfect capital mobility the price of a future
dollar is the same no matter where the claim to the dollar is located.
Thus, the equality = holdstrue (as does the corresponding equality
for any other currency).Empirical studies have pursued this implication
of perfect capital mobility by comparing nominal currency interest rates
in different financial centers, for example, the interest rates on large
dollar certificates of deposit sold in New York and those on London
Eurodollar deposits of the same maturity. Strictly speaking, such assets
do not guarantee the same payment in all states of nature--for example,
3the unregulated offshore Eurodollar market may be more prone to a
generalized financial crisis than the onshore U.S. money market.
Nonetheless, the relation between nominal interest rates on the same
currency in different financial centers is probably the least ambiguous
of the commonly-used indicators of international capital mobility.
In contrast, little can be learned about international capital
mobility from cross-country comparisons of nominal or real uncovered
returns on differentcurrencies.Such tests are uninformative about
capital mobility because they necessarily appeal to auxiliary maintained
assumptions that may be valid or not independently of the degree to which
capital is mobile.
To illustrate, let 1US be the one-period dollar interest rate
York,the corresponding rate in the London Eurodollar market, tDM the
nominal deutsche mark (DM) interest rate in Frankfurt, the EuroDM
interest rate, andX$/DM the subsequent one-period percentage change in
the dollar price of DM.
Consider how information about capital mobility is embedded in the
ex post difference in dollar returns beween dollar deposits in New York
.US.G and DM deposits in Frankfurt, — — Let6(.) denote a
conditional expectation. If one decomposes the preceding dollar return
differential into
.US.E £.E £ G —L) + - LDM-ex$/DM) + — x$/DM) + (LDM - LDM).
I I I I
U.S. onihore—foreign—exchange expectation German offshore
Offahore dir—risk premium error onshore dif-
ferential Ierentia!
4it becomes apparent that all direct information about international
capital mobility is contained in the two onshore—offshore differences.
Perfect capital mobility has the clear implication that both of the
onshore—offshore interest-rate differentials above must be zero; but the
implications of perfect capital mobility for foreign-exchange risk premia
and exchange-rate forecast errors are much less obvious.
The risk premium links expected returns on assets (such as
different—denomination Eurocurrency deposits) that are identical in
location and in all other respects except for currency of denomination.
As stressed in my 1986 paper, however, hypotheses about the relative
returns on two London deposits can yield no direct information on capital
mobility among financial centers.
It is similarly difficult to think of a significant direct link
between capital mobility and the exchange—rate forecast errors of market
participants. Conceivably the degree of capital mobility affects the
information-revelation process in foreign-exchange markets, with some
impact on the distribution of forecast errors. But no definite hypotheses
concerning such effects have been advanced, let alone tested.
Thus, only with the aid of specific and probably irrelevant
maintained hypotheses about the risk premium and expectations can one
glean information about capital mobility from ex post uncovered return
differentials such as —
1DM
—
X$,DM•Tests based on international
differences in real interest rates——domestic nominal rates less expected
domestic inflation--would require even more maintained auxiliary
5hypotheses than those based on uncovered returns.2 A more direct
approach, yielding results vastly easier to interpret, is to analyze the
one observable and relatively unambiguous indicator of capital mobility,
the onshore—offshore interest differential.3 Results based on this
indicator are reported in section 2.
Consumption insurance
Capital mobility allows countries to trade differential consumption
risks; the effect is to provide each other with insurance against purely
idiosyncratic national consumption fluctuations. In practice consumption
insurance is provided by trade in a wide array of contingent and
noncontingent securities: a cross-border exchange of common stock, for
example, will alter the statistical distribution of both trading
partners' future consumptions. The insurance function of international
capital markets is best illustrated, however, by assuming that countries
can trade a set of Arrow—Debreu securities, one of which entitles its
owner to a specified payment on a particular date if, and only if, a
2For a detailed discussionsee Obstfeld (1986).
3Tests of covered interestparity between different countries, such as
those reported by Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) and Frankel (1993), can be
formulated so that they are equivalent to comparisons of onshore and
offshore interest rates in the same currency. To return to the example,
let be the one-period forward premium for DM in terms of dollars
quoted in the London market. Eurocurrency arbitrage ensures that=tM
+s,DM'so the covered differential +s/DM
— betweenthe
Frankfurt DM market and the Eurodollar market is identical to the
onshore-offshore DM differential —
LDM•
6well—defined event, or "state of nature," occurs.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of trade in such securities for a
world in which there are two countries peopled by representative agents,
A and B, two states of nature, 1 and 2, and in which consumption of a
homogeneous nonproduced output is the only argument in utility functions.
At the endowment point E,countryA is relatively well—endowed with state
1 consumption and country B with state 2 consumption; that is, state 1 is
relatively more favorable to the fortunes of country A, state 2 to those
of country B. Otherwise the two countries are, for simplicity, portrayed
as being identical. If the free exchange of Arrow—Debreu securities is
allowed, country A exports, and country B imports, securities that pay
off in state 1; to balance this trade country A imports, and country B
exports, securities that pay off in state 2. At the resulting free—trade
allocation, point F,bothcountries have raised their utilities by
reducing the variability of consumption across states of nature.
Notice that this outcome is predicted by the classical principle of
comparative advantage, whereby a country exports the good whose domestic
autarky price is relatively low.4 The relative price of the two available
Arrow-Debreu securities can be identified with the price of state 1
consumption in terms of state 2 consumption. As usual, the free-trade
price, shown as p in figure 1, lies between the countries' autarky
prices; and in a trading equilibrium, the countries have equated their
marginal rates of substitution across states to p, and thus to each
other.
4Svensson (1988) places this result in a generalized setting.
7The implication of the particular example shown in figure 1 is that
underfreetrade in state—contingent assets, each country will equalize
its consumption across states of nature. This implication is too strong
as a general empirical prediction because national differences in wealth
usually would preclude consumption equalization across states of nature
even in a Pareto-optimal world. In general, the implication of an
efficient allocation of consumption risks is that countries' marginal
utilitiesofconsumption are perfectly correlated across states of
nature;noticethat if this statistical perfect correlation holds true,
national marginal rates of substitution across states of nature
necessarily coincide.5
The preceding empirical prediction stems from two distinct
assumptions: that there is free international asset trade, and that the
available set of securities available to trade is complete, so that all
consumption risks are insurable. In theory either of these two
assumptions can fail independently of the other; in practice, it is clear
that the existence of nonverifiable contingencies and actions limits the
extent to which individuals can contract to share risks. Even under
5Let cA(s.) becountry A consumption in state =1,2, ...,N),let
u. be the probability of state ,andlet U Ec (s1),c ,c =
ZNIrUAICA(S)Jbe country A's expected utility. Then, with similar
notation for country B, marginal utilities are perfectly correlated if,
for some constant A and for every state ,lr.uAlEcA(s.))=
BB Air.u '[c (s.)J. But this condition implies the equalization of marginal
rates of substitution across states, ir.u '(c (s.)1/n9u 'Ec (s,)I=
B,B B,B ir.uEc (s.)J/iu Ic (st)l.
8perfect capital mobility, there thus may be no close ex post association
between national consumption levels. Other things equal, however,
increasing international capital mobility should entail an increasing
tendency for positively correlated consumption comovements among
countries. Evidence related to this prediction is discussed in section 3.
The International allocation of investment
If the set of state—contingent assets people trade is sufficiently
rich, perfect capital mobility leads to an efficient international
allocation of investment: at the margin, a decision to invest a unit of
output in country B rather than country A should not affect the expected
value of the flow of future world output.
The clause concerning the richness of the available asset menu is
crucial, because the expected value of world output is the sum of output
realizations in different states of nature weighted by state-contingent
output prices. If the required set of state—contingent assets does not
exist, people generally won't have common marginal rates of consumption
substitution across all states of nature, and there is no presumption
that investment will be efficiently allocated throughout the world.6
In a world of uncertainty and incomplete markets, it therefore is
difficult to judge how close global investment patterns are to those that
free capital mobility would imply. Researchers hoping to assess capital
6lJnder restrictive theoretical conditions, an efficient complete-markets
allocation can be reached even when a complete set of state-contingent
assets is not traded. For different examples, see Rubinstein (1974) and
Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
9mobility from this perspective have been forced to rely on very rough
measures of constrained investment efficiency.
A number of studies attempt to compare, directly or indirectly
through an examination of capital—output ratios, the marginal
contribution of installed capital to national outputs. In the presence
of capital installation costs, however, this marginal product of capital
need not be the same everywhere. What should be observed under capital
mobility is a tendency for time-averaged marginal products of capital in
various countries to converge. Correspondingly, world investment should
flow disproportionately toward countries where capital is relatively more
productive.
A controversial way of evaluating the efficiency of the global
allocation of investment is proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and
Feldstein (1983). They argue that the productivity of capital in a
country is not systematically linked to the determinants of its saving
rate, and infer that national saving and domestic investment rates should
not be systematically associated either if capital is internationally
mobile. Other things equal, a rise in a country's saving rate should
cause a current-account surplus that directs the freed resources toward
their most efficient worldwide uses; other things equal, an increase in
the productivity of a nation's capital should cause a current-account
deficit that draws in savings from abroad. Feldstein and Horioka's
conclusion that this picture does not match the postwar facts has spawned
a large literature that is reviewed in section 4 below.
102. Evidence on the law of one price
Section 1 argued that the least ambiguous evidence on international
capital mobility comes from a comparison of nominal interest rates on
onshore and offshore loans of the same currency. Under perfect capital
mobility, the interest rate on a three-month French franc deposit in
Paris, for example, should equal that on a three-month French franc
deposit in London.
Numerous studies have compared onshore-offshore interest
differentials or the closely related covered interest differentials;
partial surveys are in Frankel (1993) and Obstfeld (1986). Frankel (1993,
table 2.4) reports statistics on the size and variability of covered
interest differentials for a range of industrialized and developing
countries over the period September 1982—April 1988. His conclusion is
that by 1988, departures from free capital mobility, indicated by large
short—term covered interest differentials, were small for a number of
countries. (Popper 1993 reaches the same conclusion regarding long-term
differentials.) Included in the group of financially open economies are
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan. For other economies
in Frankel's sample, most glaringly Greece, Mexico, and Portugal,
substantial barriers to capital movement apparently remained as of 1988.
This latter group includes France, Ireland, and Italy, European Comunity
(EC) members that adopted timetables for capital—account liberalization
as part of the single-market program set out in the EC's Single European
Act of 1987.
Table 1 summarizes a set of more detailed and up-to-date data for
11four industrialized countries, France (panel A). Italy (panel B), Germany
(panel C), and Japan (panel D). For each currency the onshcre interest
rate is the three—month domestic interbank rate, the offshore rate the
three-month rate in the London Euromarket. Daily Reuters data covering
January 1982—April 1993 (as reported by Data Resources, Inc.,) are used.
As these data did not appear to be completely accurate, suspicious
observations were checked against the daily reports in the FLrtarictal
Ttmes of London and corrected when necessary.
Many empirical studies ignore the existence of information on both
the ask and bid rates of interest at which banks are willing to supply
and accept funds.7 Ask and bid prices are essential data in comparing
rates of return internationally, however, because the rates market
participants actually face include transaction costs that sum to (at
most) the ask-bid spread quoted by banks. In addition, use of the
distinct ask and bid rates allows the researcher to test a wider range of
hypotheses about financial market links.
Under free capital mobility, borrowers have the option of using
whichever market is cheapest, while lenders can place funds wherever they
get the highest net return. Thus, while borrowing and lending rates in a
given center need not be the same, borrowing rates should be the same in
all centers where borrowing is occurring, lending rates should be the
same in all centers where lending is occurring, and thus the ask-bid
spread should be the same in all centers where both activities are
7One plus the ask rate is theprice of current money in terms of future
money that a bank requires in order to supply current funds; it always
exceeds one plus the bid rate, which is the price of current money in
terms of future money that a bank will pay for current funds.
12occurring.
The first two columns of numbers in table 1 compute period daily
averages of differences beween onshore and offshore bid (denoted by an
underbar) and ask (denoted by an overbar) rates of interest on loans of
domestic currency. As above, the subscripts on the nominal interest rate
i refer to currency of denomination while the superscripts refer to
location, either the home country (F' for France, I for Italy, G for
Germany, J for Japan) or the offshore Eurocurrency market (symbolized by
the letter E). The last two columns of table 1 report average onshore and
offshore ask-bid spreads, which must be the same if ask and bid rates are
the same onshore and off. The use of period averages is not ideal.
because large postive and negative daily observations could cancel when
the average is taken. The standard deviations given in parentheses below
the average return differences offer a rough idea of the extent to which
such cancellation has occurred. Figures 2—6, which graph the daily data
on onshore-offshore bid differences, also contain some of this
information.8
In principle, two financial centers linked by free capital mobility
could have different ask rates (if banks are not lending in one center)
or bid rates (if no deposits are being taken in one center). This
situation is unlikely to prevail for any length of time, however, and
thus should not be relevant in analyzing the period averages reported in
the table. Table 1 also reports the returns to a hypothetical arbitrageur
who borrows in one center at the ask rate and lends in the other center
81n comparing these figures, be aware that their left-hand scales differ.
13at the bid rate. (The third column is the return to borrowing offshore
and lending onshore, the fourth column the return to borrowing onshore
and lending offshore.) Since actual arbitrage opportunities would always
be exploited, hypothetical arbitrage profits are an unambiguous indicator
of capital—market segmentation and must always be absent under free
capital mobility. Obviously, the indicators in table 1 are not
independent of each other. For example, offshore-to-onshore arbitrage is
profitable only if the onshore bid exceeds the offshore bid and the
offshore ask—bid spread is sufficiently small; similarly, profitable
onshore—to—offshore arbitrage requires an offshore bid above the onshore
bid and a sufficiently small onshore ask-bid spread.
The first period analyzed in the table extends through the entry
into force of the Single European Act in January 1987. For France(panel
A) there is evidence of significant barriers to capital mobility during
this period. Average ask and bid rates of interest on French franc loans
are much higher offshore than onshore; and the average profitability of
hypothetical onshore-to-offshore arbitrage operations is substantially
positive. The interpretation of these results is that France maintained
controls on capital outflows that kept domestic rates below Eurocurrency
rates, particularly around realignments (Giavazzi and Pagano 1985). The
especially high divergences occurring around realignments are apparent in
figure 2. Note also that the ask—bid, spread is lower onshore than
offshore, consistent with the relatively thinness of the Eurofranc market
in the first half of the 1980s.
The last three periods shown begin roughly around the last French
realignment within the European Monetary System's Exchange Rate Mech
anisin
14(ERM) (February 1, 1987), the deadline for abolition of French capital
controls under the Single European Act (July 1, 1990), and the month of
the surprise Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty on European
monetary and political union (June 1, 1992). This last event set off a
period of turbulence in exchange markets that culminated in the
"flotation' of ERM currencies on August 2, 1992.
In all three of these periods the average onshore—offshore
difference is on the order of 10 basis points in magnitude for both bids
and asks. Hypothetical arbitrage profits are negative on average, and
average ask-bid spreads much closer in the two markets. Clearly, the
integration of onshore and offshore money markets is much higher than
before 1987.
The final period, that of the ERMcrisis,is clearly more turbulent
than the previous two: the standard errors of returns are much higher, as
are ask-bid spreads. As figure 3 (an enlargement of the January
1992-April 1993 data) shows, some large gaps between onshore and offshore
bid rates emerged during September 1992, when the franc first came under
concerted attack by speculators. Similar data have been identified as
evidence of lingering capital controls by some commentators.9
Notice in figure 3 that the onset of ERM turbulence is the dividing
point between a period in which onshore bid rates usually exceed offshore
rates by a small amount, and one in which the reverse is true. This
pattern would be consistent with a shift from a regime in which the
9The Economist offered this interpretation of the unusual onshore-
offshore French franc differentials. See "A Funny Thing Happened,"
Economist, October 10, 1992, p. 97.
15market attaches a small but positive probability to future capital
controls, to one in which mild official discouragernents to capital
outflow are actually in place. Between September 1992 and April 1993
there are, however, only four instances of pure profits from
onshore-to-offshore arbitrage, all in 1992: on September 22 and
November 24, and on December 1.
The case of Italy (panel B of table 1) also
restricted capital mobility before February 1987.
and ask rates both exceed onshore counterparts,
mean (15 basis point) profit from undertaking a
onshore-to-offshore arbitrage.1° As Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) observed
using a shorter data sample, domestic Italian interest rates diverge less
from the corresponding offshore rates than do French domestic rates
during this initial period. Nonetheless, the data are consistent with the
view that Italy, like France, restricted capital outflows and thus held
domestic interest rates artificially low. As in the case of France, the
ask—bid spread before February 1987 is higher offshore.
The next subperiod, February 1, 1987-June 30, 1990, shows some
convergence to offshore conditions: average onshore rates now rise a bit
above average offshore rates, average arbitrage opportunities disappear,
and the absolute mean difference between offshore and onshore spreads
narrows.
After July 1, 1990 average onshore rates actually rise further above
offshore rates and apparent opportunities for profitable offshore-to—
10The large standard error on this small mean value implies episodically





and there exists a small
hypotheticalonshore (that is, inward) arbitrage open up (see figure 4). Italy adopted
a narrow ERM band for the lira in January 1990 and then removed its
remaining capital—account restrictions in May. Subsequently, Italy's
desire to avoid realignment clashed increasingly with the lira's ongoing
real appreciation and with the growth in domestic public debt. Plausibly,
the onshore interest interest premium reflected market fears that capital
controls might be reimposed in the future to shore up Italy's
increasingly strict interpretation of its ERM commitments. Consistent
with this view is the behavior of the average onshore premium after June
1, 1992, a period that includes Italy's abandonment of the ERM for a
float on September 17, 1992: the average premium drops and average
arbitrage profits disappear as one key motive for reimposing capital
controls evaporates.'1 After September 1, 1992 the sole instance of a pure
profit from outward arbitrage occurs on January 4, the first business day
of 1993.
Panel C of table 1 shows that before February 1987, Germany's
onshore interest rates were on average slightly above offshore rates,
consistent with official measures discouraging capital inflow (see also
figure 5). There is even a slight average profit from hypothetical inward
arbitrage during this period. Ask—bid spreads, however, are essentially
the same in the onshore and offshore markets throughout the full sample
period.
In all three subperiods after February 1987, onshore and offshore
Changes in Banca d'Italia required-reserve policymay also have played a
role in these developments. See Goldstein et al. (1993, p, 73).
17rates are very close on average and mean arbitrage profits are negative.
Some large onshore premia emerge during the fall 1992 ERM crisis,
however: over the period September 1992—April 1993, offshore—to—onshore
arbitrage appears profitable on 51 out of 242 business days! This pattern
may reflect continuing government intervention in the capital markets.
Goldstein et al. (1993, p. 56) mention the "gentlemen's agreement"
whereby the Bundesbank may impose high marginal reserve requirements on
loans in excess of a certain limit to German banks from their London
branches.
For Japan (panel D of table 1) a less complete set of data were
available from Reuters. The available data show a very small average
difference between onshore and offshore bid rates over the first sample
subperiod, consistent with Japan's substantial liberalization of capital
movements in December 1980.12
Surprisingly, the subperiod beginning with February 1987 shows a 60
basis—point average excess of offshore over onshore bid rates; figure 6
makes clear that this differential is much too long-lived to ascribe to
the time-of—day difference in the Japanese onshore and offshore data.
Ueda (1993, p. 19) suggests that before November 1988 the Bank of Japan
used heavy administrative guidance to separate the interbank loan market
from both the onshore certificate of deposit market and the Euroyen
market; during the subperiod in question, the Bank of Japan wished to
hold interbank rates below onshore and offshore open—market rates.'3 Thus,
12Marston (1993a) examines differences inJapanese and U.S. short—term
interest rates and reviews related literature.
November 1988 the Bank took measures liberalizing the interbank
18the onshore-offshore gaps in figure 6 indicate a segmentation within the
domesticfinancialmarket that, as a side effect, insulated part of that
market from globalforces.
Over the last two subperiods the mean onshore bid exceeds the mean
offshore bid by relatively small amounts. The ask-bid spread in the
Euroyen market is so slim that even the small onshore premium implies
positive average arbitrage profits from borrowing offshore and investing
onshore. These divergences grow stronger in the period starting with June
1992. In light of the data's imperfections it is hard to put too much
weight on these numbers as indicators of capital-market restriction.
Faced with a punctured "bubble" economy and a rising yen in these years,
however, Japanese officials did have incentives to discourage capital
inflows through informal means.
What conclusions follow from these and similar data for other
industrial countries? For the four countries in table 1 as well as for
others such as the United States and United Kingdom that have liberalized
international financial transactions, there are extremely close links
between onshore and offshore money markets, links that increased in
strength over the 1980s. The data also show, however, that even for these
countries actual or prospective government interventions remain a
significant factor in times of turbulence. And in most cases governments
still have instruments that can drive at least temporary wedges between
onshore and offshore interest rates. European countries that have not
completely opened their capital accounts, such as Spain, Portugal,
market.
19Ireland, and Greece, openly retain such instruments; all four used them
during the ERM currency crisis that began in 1992.14 Even most of these
countries have strong links to world capital markets. For example,
Ireland's onshore and offshore interest rates were close on the whole
during the period from the late 1980s to 1992 (see figure 7).
Matters are different in the developing world, where high explicit
or implicit barriers to capital flows remain common. Discussions of
financial liberalization and international interest—rate linkages for
developing regions can be found in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1992),
Glick and Hutchison (1990), and Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993).
3.Thediversification of global consumption risks
This section examines evidence on the world capital market's success
in helping countries trade consumption risks to achieve a mutually
preferable allocation of consumption across states of nature. Researchers
have taken several approaches to this question. Some look directly at
national or regional correlations in consumption. Others look at the
extent of trade in explicitly state-contingent assets. As will become
apparent in the discussion, the implications of such data for capital
mobility are ambiguous unless specific and strong side assumption are
made about the functioning of domestic and international capital markets.
Much recent research is aimed at testing these assumptions, and as
difficult as the task is, it is justified by the need better to
understand the current and potential risk allocation role of world
14See Goldstein et a!. (1993) andCommittee of Governors of the Central
Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community (1993).
20capital markets.
International consumption correlations
A simple maximization problem illustrates how global consumption
allocations would behave in the ideal case of perfect international trade
in a complete set of state—contingent assets. Since the resulting
allocation is Pareto—optimal, its properties can be read off from the
first—order conditions that a world planner would derive in maximizing a
social welfare function linear in national utilities.
An analytically convenient starting point is the assumption of a
representative national agent for each country. This assumption, which
will be discussed further below, amounts to supposing that risks have
already been shared optimally within each country, leaving only the
remaining gains from trade between countries as the analytical focus.
Country ?'s representative agent maximizes (from time t =0)the expected
utility functional
=
whereaE (0,1)is a discount factor, c (as before) is consumption of an
internationally tradable good andis consumption of a nontradable good
(possibly leisure).15
15This formulation already imposesstrong restrictions on national utility
functions (e.g., time— and state—separability), and more will be imposed
later. Without some assumptions on preferences, however, no observable
implications of international risk sharing could be derived.
21Given N countries and fixed country welfare weights , =1,2,
N, the planner maximizes the social welfare function
N..
LIf =: fu
by distributing the tradable consumption available on each date, and in
each state, among the N countries. If c is world tradable consumption on
date t, a necessary condition for distributing it efficiently among
countries is
(1)w.u(c,x)= u(c,x) (forall countriesand ),
whereu1(c,x)isa partial derivative with respect to c. Equation (1)
implies that for tradable goods, marginal rates of substitution across
states of nature are equalized internationally in an efficient
allocation. Because nontradables cannot be shifted among countries,
however, the corresponding condition on marginal utilities from the
nontradable need not hold.
To derive more specific predictions from (1), suppose that no
nontradables x are consumed and that utility functions have the specific
form u(c',x) =
l—R(c)'.Thenif logc —1oc1.(1) implies
(2)c=(R/Rjc; t
that is, with isoelastic preferences logarithmic growth rates of
consumption are perfectly correlated ex post in all countries. If
22countries have different (fixed) rates of time preference, equation (2)
will contain a constant term but the perfect correlation prediction will
still hold true.If capital is internationally mobile but asset markets
are incomplete, conditions weaker than perfect correlation will
characterize the relationship between countries' ex post intertemporal
marginaL rates of substitution. As noted above, informational asymmetries
generate moral hazards that make certain risks uninsurable. In the
extreme case where only a riskless consumption—indexed bond is traded
among countries, expected, but not ex post, intertemporal marginal rates
of substitution will coincide internationally. This case is the one
analyzed in stochastic versions of the life-cycle/permanent—income
hypothesis. If only nominally risk-free bonds are traded, expected
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution for money (rather than
consumption) will be equalized.16 More generally, ex post cross-country
differences in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution will be
uncorrelated with any random variables on which international contracts
can be written. Under incomplete markets asset trade allows the sharing
of some, but not all, risks.
To compare reality against the predictions of the specific
complete—markets model just set out, table 2 examines the correlations of
national annual real private consumption growth rates, measured in per
capita terms, with rest-of-world per capita private consumption growth
over two eras in the development of world capital markets, 1951-72 and
16See Kollmann (1992) and Obstfeld (1989).
231973_88.17 The consumption data come from the Penn World Table assembled
by Summers and Heston (1991); the "world" shown in table 2 consists of
countries with continuous 1930-88 data rated of quality C— or above by
Summers and Heston.
All the correlation coefficients, denoted p(c,c1') (where cW is rest—
of—world real per capita consumption), are below the value of 1 that
would obtain with isoelastic utility were capital perfectly mobile and
markets complete. Several regularities in the results are, however,
apparent.
For the post-1973 period--a period during which the volume of
international financial transactions has increased enormously relative to
world output--consumption growth in industrial countries is on average
somewhat more highly correlated with rest-of—world consumption growth
than is consumption growth in developing countries. Within the group of
industrial countries, however, there are sharp differences.
For a majority of EC members, domestic and world consumption growth
are relatively strongly correlated; Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which
still maintain capital controls, as well as Italy, which did so through
early 1990, are in the minority, as is, surprisingly, Luxembourg. For
virtually all EC countries the correlation coefficient rises between the
first and second subperiods (most dramatically for Germany). Multiple
'7The current modelimplies that each country's consumption growth is
perfectly correlated with world consumption growth under the assumption
that all countries have the same value of R.. Looking at correlations
with world consumption growth, rather than at the customary pairwise
consumption—growth correlations, economizes on the number of estimates
reported. This procedure also has some potential statistical advantages
(see Obstfeld 1994).
24regressions show that this last result persists even after one controls
for possible parallel responses to the two OPEC oil-price shocks.'8
For industrial countries outside the EC, the consumption
correlations tend to be lower except for Switzerland and Japan. Moreover,
apart from those two countries, there is a tendency for the correlations
to decrease, not increase over time. To explain the contrast with the EC
countries would require a country-by--country analysis. One general
factor, however, may be the exchange—rate regime: these countries opted
for greater exchange—rate flexibility than the EC countries in the early
1970s partly because they desired to decouple domestic from world
consumption growth. The Japanese example shows, however, that floating
exchange rates and even capital controls (which persisted in Japan
through 1980) need not rule out a strong coherence between domestic and
world consumption growth.
One way to highlight the change in German and Japanese consumption
behavior after 1973 is through a simple regression. Letdenote country
's real per capita GDP, tnv its real per capita investment, andits
real per capita government spending. Absent international asset markets,
domestic per capita consumption c would be limited to y —tnv—g.
The regression
. . Ct = + a1c+c2Mog(y
—nv
— +
givesan indication of whether consumption growth is more strongly
18See Obstfeld (1994) for further discussion.
25associated with global or with domestic factors.'9 The Summers-Heston data
lead to the following results:
Germany Japan
1951-72 =-0.18' = 0.76 =-0.152 =0.76
(0.33) (0.13) (0.37) (0.13)
1973-88 =1.072 =0.02 =1.18,= 0.35.
(0.32) (0.20) (0.42) (0.26)
The regressions show a stunning reversal for both countries. In the
earlier period national consumption growth is insignificantly correlated
with world consumption growth but moves nearly one—for-one with the
growth of GDP net of investment and government spending. From 1973 on the
opposite is true.
A fundamental identification problem is suggested by the columns in
table 2 labeled p(yyW) which report correlations between national per
capita output growth rates and rest-of-world per capita output growth.
For most of the industrial countries these correlations rise between the
two subperiods shown. Thus, while any increase over time in the
consumption between national and world consumption growth could be due to
increased risk sharing through the international capital market, it could
also be explained by other mechanisms, such as a naive Keynesian
consumption function in which consumption merely tracks current output or
by one of the richer behavioral models discussed by Carroll and Summers
'9See Obstfeld (1994) formore discussion of this equation and its
estimation.
26(1991). The table 2 correlations p(c,y) between domestic output and
consumption growth are high in most cases, but are often well below
unity.
Again, only country—by—country analysis can resolve this question.
For example, tests reported in Obstfeld (1994) show that the high
post-1973 correlation of Japanese with world consumption growth may
reflect only the high correlation coefficient between world consumption
and Japanese output (0.72), coupled with the high correlation of Japanese
consumption and output. In contrast, German output growth also has a very
high correlation coefficient with world consumption growth (0.84), yet
adds no significant explanatory power to a regression of German on world
consumption growth. These regressions are somewhat analogous to those
Campbell and Mankiw (1991) examine in modeling departures from the
permanent-income theory.
Among the developing countries in table 2. a few have reasonably
high post-1973 correlation coefficients with world consumption
growth-—notably, a few Central American countries, Chile, Cyprus, and
Thailand. But this is not the norm. Notice that the developing countries
with high post-1973 values of p(c,c1'') also have high values of p(yyW) a
pattern probably due to the rudimentary financial markets available in
most of these countries over much of the sample period.
Before drawing strong conclusions from table 2 about feasible gains
from risk—sharing, recall that (2) was based on some restrictive
auxiliary assumptions, for example, the assumption that nontradables are
not consumed. If some consumption goods are nontradable, there is no
necessity for national consumptions to be perfectly correlated: risks
27relating to the consumption of nontraded goods may be impossible to share
(Stockman and DelIas 1989). At best, consumption of tradabieswillobey
(2) if the utility function u(c,x)isseparable (but still isoelastic
in ci). In more complicated models, even this simple property can fail
despite complete markets.2°
By investigating the stochastic consequences of a labor/leisure
tradeoff and/or nontradables, several studies have tried to reconcile
consumption correlations such as those shown for the industrial countries
in table 1 with complete markets and perfect capital mobility.
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) and Stockman and Tesar (1990)
observe that the pairwise correlation coefficients between
(Hodrick—Prescott (1980) filtered) industrial -country consumption levels
tend to be lower than the corresponding output correlations. This
property of the data is quite evident in table 2: after 1973, p(c,cW)
exceeds p(y,yW) only for Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland among
23 industrial countries. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland fail to replicate
this pattern using a plausibly calibrated two-country intertemporal
production model with uncertainty.
Stockman and Tesar introduce nontradable consumption into a similar
equilibrium business—cycle model and find that the addition of preference
shocks allows a closer approximation to the empirical correlation
coefficients for national consumptions and outputs. Devereux, Gregory,
and Smith (1992) show that a specific utility nonseparability between
consumption and labor supply allows an equilibrium business-cycle model
20Stulz (1981) addresses these questLons in a general setting.
28to replicate the U.S.-Canada consumption-correlation coefficient. They do
not, however, subject their model to the tougher test of fitting other
moments of the data. Van Wincoop (1992a, table 1) adjusts annual 1970-88
consumption data from the United Nations System of National Accounts for
both nontradability and durability. He finds that for most industrial
countries, the correlation between the growth of adjusted domestic per
capita consumption and adjusted world per capita consumption is much
higher than in table 2 above (albeit still imperfect). His calculations
do not, however, control for the possibility that correlations are also
higher among the growth rates of similarly adjusted per capita domestic
outputs.
Lewis (1993) carries out a panel study of the growth of nondurable,
tradable consumption using data from 48 countries sampled at five-year
intervals over 1970-85. Remarkably, she finds that while domestic output
growth is a strong and significant determinant of total consumption
growth in her panel, its effect on nondurable, tradable consumption
growth is statistically insignificant; furthermore, domestic output
growth explains less than 1 percent of the dependent variable's variance
(as opposed to about two—thirds of the variance of total consumption
growth). Although imprecisely estimated, the coefficient of output growth
in Lewis's equation for nondurable, tradable consumption remains sizable.
In light of possible measurement errors, and her panel methodology's
merging of countries with different degrees of financial openness, a
judicious conclusion is that durability and nontradability go part but
probably not all of the way in explaining why total consumption growth is
highly correlated with domestic output growth. Lewis does not look at
29the influence on consumption of idiosyncratic factors other than income
growth, so her results do not explain why, as in van Wincoop's (1992a)
study, international consumption correlations remain imperfect even after
attention is restricted to nondurable tradables.
The message of this body of work seems to be that after allowing f or
nontradables and durables, equilibrium complete-markets models that
assume perfect capital mobility still cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation of international consumption correlations unless unexplained
preference shifts are assumed as in Stockman and Tesar (1990). Taste
shocks are not inherently implausible, but until they are modeled more
fully, there is no way of telling if the heavy explanatory burden they
bear in the Stockman-Tesar model is reasonable.2'
An alternative approach starts by acknowledging that the assumption
of complete asset markets is glaringly at odds with the facts. Events
such as job loss generally are not completely insurable because of the
potential for moral hazard. More generally, labor incomes cannot be
privately insured against all contingencies. Some shocks simply cannot be
foreseen with sufficient clarity to be provided for in contracts. Thus,
even with perfect capital mobility, there is no reason to expect high
correlations even between the tradable—goods consumptions of different
countries.
Empirical studies of U.S. micro—data, such as Cochrane (1991), Mace
21Canova and Ravn (1993), Lewis (1993), and Obstfeld(1994) all allow for
preference shocks in their formal tests of consumption risk—sharing
models. In tests on quarterly data for 9 OECD countries, Canova and Ravn
find little evidence against moment restrictions implied by a model based
on equation (2) above. They do, however, reject long—run implications of
the model.
30(1991), and Mankiw and Zeldes(1991),confirm that even within modern
industrial economies there are unexploited opportunities f or risk
sharing.22 In line with this conclusion, van Wincoop (1992b) finds that
the correlations among (Hodrick—Prescott filtered) per capita consumption
levels in Japanese prefectures are well explained by a simulation model
in which domestic Japanese financial markets are incomplete and subject
to limited participation.
These considerations have three implications for the class of models
discussed so far in this section. First, the representative national
consumer is a hypothetical construct that, while perhaps useful for
illustrating the incremental gains from international compared with
national risk-sharing, gives a misleading picture of how national
consumption levels actually are determined. Second, imperfect
correlations among industrial-country consumptions are likely to be in
large measure the result of asset-market incompleteness rather than
international capital—market segmentation. Third, studies of
international consumption-correlatedness that counterfactual ly assume
complete markets probably cannot throw much light on the international
mobility of capital. A more fruitful approach is to consider models
admitting alternative financial-market structures (for example, Cole
1988), and ultimately models in which market incompleteness arises
22lndeed, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) find such unexploited
opportunities even within extended U.S. families. Deaton (1992, p. 37),
who surveys related microeconomic literature, reminds us that moral
hazard problems are relevant even within families.
Van Wincoop (1992c) shows that such a model also can rationalize
cross-country consumption correlations.
31endogenously (for example, Gertler and Rogoff 1990 and Lucas 1992).
Comparing regional and international rtsksharing
If asset markets are incomplete, is there any way that consumption
correlations or related measures can throw light on the extent of
international capital mobility? Atkeson and Bayoumi (1992) propose an
imaginative approach to this problem: they use the measured extent of
regional risk-sharing within the United States as a benchmark against
which the efficiency of international risk-sharing among a group of
industrial countries can be judged. In principle, this methodology can
help one judge the extent to which low international consumption
correlations are due to international asset—trade barriers as opposed to
incomplete markets.
The findings, though generally pointing to higher regional than
international financial integration, are somewhat ambiguous. Regional
financial transfers within the U.S. appear to be much larger in absolute
value than resource transfers into or out of the main industrial
countries, suggesting more extensive asset trade within the U.S. In
contrast, U.S. regional growth in real retail sales (a consumption proxy)
is no less correlated with regional ouput growth than is OECD national
consumption growth with national output growth.
Atkeson and Bayoumi also find that in U.S. data, regional shifts in
capital income are virtually uncorrelated with regional capital product
but are highly correlated with U.S. capital income. In Europe, national
capital incomes, though uncorrelated with national capital products, seem
much less correlated than in the U.S. with total European capital income.
32Atkeson and Bayoumi interpret this result as indicating better
capital—income diversification within the U.S. than within Europe, but an
opposite interpretation is entirely compatible with their findings: U.S.
investors do not hold assets abroad, whereas Europe is open enough
financially that much of its capital income is earned on other
continents. The consumption correlations in table 2 do not obviously
contradict the alternative view.
Table 3 provides another regional/international comparison using
yearly data assembled by Robert Dekle on per capita consumption and
income (which is interpreted here as an output proxy) in 45 of the 47
Japanese prefectures over 1975_88.24 The column labelled p(c,c) shows the
correlation of prefectural per capita private consumption growth with
mean per capita consumption growth in the other 44 prefectures. These
numbers are similar on the whole to those reported for countries in table
2; slightly less than half the time, the consumption correlations are
below the corresponding income correlations, labeled p(y,yJ)• The column
labeled p(c,y) shows the correlation between per capita consumption and
income growth by prefecture. In about two-thirds of the cases these
numbers are rather high, as are most of the corresponding numbers for
national economies in table 2; but in other cases the correlations are
relatively low and sometimes even negative. While there is thus some
limited evidence that risk sharing within Japan may be more efficient
than is risk sharing among industrial countries, this is not evident in
24See Dekle (1993) for a description of these data and an econometric
analysis of their implications for inter-regional capital mobility.
33the intra—national consumption correlations.
in contrast to these results for Japan, Crucini (1992) finds in
annual 1971-90 data that consumption growth rates among Canadian
provinces generally are more highly correlated than are provincial output
growth rates or different countries' consumption growth rates.
A problem in comparing regional risk sharing within nations with
risk sharing among nations when asset markets are incomplete is that a
predominance of uninsurable country-specific shocks can create a spurious
impression of greater risk-sharing within than between countries. Another
drawback of the approach is that more goods are nontradable across
national borders than across regional borders, so that, other things
equal, one would naturally expect inter-regional consumption correlations
to be higher than international ones. Finally, government-mediated
transfers and spending play a significant role in pooling risks within
countries. It is conceivable that any finding of higher inter-regional
than international consumption correlation is entirely an artifact of
government intervention. Despite these and other ambiguities, refinements
of this general approach promise a better understanding of how
international and intranational financial linkages differ.
Theextent of internationalportfolio diversification
Furtherevidence on the world capital market's promotion of
international risk sharing comes from a direct examination of
international portfolio positions. The consensus of studies such as
French and Poterba (1990, 1991), Golub (1991), and Tesar and Werner
(1992) is that there is a substantial "home bias" in the portfolios of
34industrial-country investors. French and Poterba and Tesar and Werner
argue that conventional models of portfolio choice can explain these
patterns only if domestic investors have a much more optimistic view of
the expected return on domestic assets than do foreign investors.
Alternatively, imperfect capital mobility simply could make extensive
international diversification prohibitively costly or infeasible. But in
view of the efficiency of international interest-rate arbitrage among
industrial countries (section 2). no one believes that costs or official
impediments to foreign investment are universally high enough fully to
explain the home bias in equity portfolios. Thus, there is an
trzterrzattonal dtversiftcaton puzzteY
One widely-cited estimate reports that in December 1989 U.S.
investors held 94 percent of their stock-market wealth in home equities,
Japanese investors 98 percent, and U.K. investors 82 percent (French and
Poterba 1991). These figures apparently do not control for holdings by
"home"—based corporation of assets located abroad, for example, Nissan's
Sunderland, U.K. auto plant. Investors may diversify, moreover, through
holdings of assets other than equities, such as direct investments and
bonds. French and Poterba (1991) report, for example, that 79 percent of
German corporate equity was domestically owned at the end of 1989, which
suggests a substantial home bias in German investors' portfolios.
Germany's December 1991 gross external assets, however, amounted to 72.9
percent of its GDP and its gross external liabilities to 51.4 percent of
Dumas (forthcoming)surveys models of international portfolio choice
from the perspective of the international diversification puzzle and
other asset-market puzzles.
35its GDP——numbers which could be indicative of extensive foreign
diversification.26 Such diversification might help explain the robust
correlation of German with world consumption growth noted above.
The German case may be atypical; U.S. and Japanese investors, for
example, probably have not used foreign diversification opportunities as
extensively.27 Several explanations for this puzzle have been proposed.
Stockman and Dellas (1989) argue that the presence of nontraded goods and
services may impart a significant home—asset bias to investors' portfolio
decisions. The empirical importance of home—asset bias due to
28 nontradables remains to be established, however.Another explanation
hinges on a different type of general—equilibrium consideration: if an
investor's labor income (which generally is nontradable) is negatively
correlated with her domestic capital income, the gains from foreign
diversification of capital income are reduced. This argument suggests
that the appropriate criterion for evaluating the gains from
international diversification is the scope for raising mean consumption
growth and lowering its variance. And if this scope is limited,
international diversification may be discouraged by even minimal
26Data on total German external assets and liabilitiescome from Deutsche
Bundesbank (1993, P. 45). I have supplemented these numbers with a 1991
GDP estimate of $1.58 trillion.
27For the U.S., external assetswere 34.5 percent of GDP at the end of
1991 and external liabilities 40.9 percent. The corresponding Japanese
figures are 59.2 percent (external assets) and 47.9 percent (external
liabilities). Position data come from Deustsche Bundesbank (1993, p. 45).
My GDP estimates are $5.68 trillion for the U.S. and $3.39 trillion for
Japan. These figures show considerable growth over the comparable 1987
figures reported by Brainard and Tobin (1992, p. 536). Their numbers show
that for the U.K. assets and liabilities already exceeded GNP in 1987.
28Alternative theoretical models of home—asset biasare proposed by Eldor,
Pines, and Schwartz (1988) and by Tesar (1993).
36investment barriers such as transaction costs.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) use a model calibrated to U.S. and Japanese
data to illustrate that the welfare gains from aggregate risk-sharing
among industrial countries may be as small as one-fifth of 1 percent of
GNP per year.29 Golub (1991) takes issue with this result, arguing on the
basis of 1970-87 data that despite small aggregate gains, Japanese and
U.S. recipients of exclusively corporate income cannot pool risks with
human or noncorporate capital and, as a result, would gain substantially
from freer asset trade. Thus, strong incentives for cross—border
diversification might remain. Van Wiricoop's (1992c) calibration model
similarly implies that owners of capital can face significantly stronger
incentives to diversify than aggregate consumption figures suggest. A
useful extension of this work would attempt to distinguish empirically
between the labor incomes of stockholders and nonstockholders.
Brainard and Tobin (1992) and Baxter and Jermann (1993) argue that
because human capital is largely nontradable, its owners have a strong
incentive to go short in domestic equities and long in foreign equities
when the returns to domestic human and physical capital are positively
correlated. Whether this deepens the home bias puzzle in practice
requires further research on the international correlations among returns
to human and physical capital. Golub (1991). for example, shows that
human and physical capital returns (measured by labor income and
corporate profits, respectively) appear negatively correlated for Japan,
29See also Mendoza (1991) and Obstfeld (1992), who present alternative
estimates of small industrial—country gains from asset trade.
37and thatthe optimal portfolio of a Japanese worker can be skewed toward
home equities. This inference, however, depends onGolub's assumption
that the national-income account proxies he uses tomeasurereturns to
humancapital andequitydo notdistort the truestatistical relationship
between those variables.
Even the magnitudes of the aggregategainsfrom risk sharing among
industrial countries are in dispute. Van Wincoop (1992a), who examines a
larger sample of countries, assumes a lower rate of time preference, and
allows for some nondiversifiable consumption risk, finds gains from risk
sharing much larger than those found by Cole and Obstfeld. Obstfeld
(forthcoming, a) shows that financial integration can bring very large
welfare gains if diversification has effects on investment and output
growth rates. Before the puzzle of low diversification is resolved, more
work on understanding both the magnitude and distribution of the gains
from international risk sharing is needed.
The importance of transaction costs also is unclear. Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) argue that small transaction costs--for example, the
extra paperwork needed to obtain a tax credit for asset income withheld
by a foreign government--could substantially discourage international
diversification. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) confirm this as a
theoretical possibility. They show that introducing small costs of
international transactions into their empirically calibrated model leads
to an equilibrium very close to the autarky allocation. This result,
however, is based on a representative-agent model which may seriously
understate individual, as opposed to aggregate, gains from trade. Tesar
and Werner (1992) find that the turnover rate for foreign equity
38investments is higher than that in domestic equity markets, and offer
this difference as evidence that transaction costs are not important in
promoting international equity-market segmentation. Transaction costs
other than turnover costs could, however, be important impediments to
cross—border investments.
To summarize, the available data on international portfolio
positions suggest that many industrial countries are not diversified
nearly to the extent that standard models of global portfolio choice
would predict. The reasons could range from transaction costs to
internationally asymmetric information (Gehrig 1993) to differential tax
treatment of domestic and foreign investors (Gordon and Varian 1989) to
irrational expectations concerning the relative returns on domestic and
foreign investments.30 Future progress in unraveling the apparent puzzle
may come from a more disaggregated analysis of different income groups'
investing behavior. Even at the aggregate level, more detailed
information on national balance sheets would give a better perspective
from which to evaluate the risk and return characteristics of national
portfolios.
Such analyses would throw light on a related outstanding puzzle: how
to reconcile convincingly the possibly small aggregate gains from pooling
national consumption risks with the apparently large unexploited gains to
expected wealth maximizers from international equity diversification.
This is no small task. The literatures on stock—market volatility and the
30 . . . . MorrisGoldstein has suggested that there is also a noticeable regLorlal
bias in international investment, a phenomenon consistent with the notion
that informational barriers to international investment are important.
39equity—premium puzzle show how hard it is to rationalize the behavior of
equity returns on the basis of simple optimal-consumption models. Mankiw
and Zeldes's (1991) observation that United States stockholders have more
variable consumption than nonstockholders could be part of an explanation
if true in other industrial countries. Even this finding does not enable
Mankiw and Zeldes fully to resolve the equity—premium puzzle for the
United States.
Gains from risk-sharing by developing countries
Even if it is true that industrial countries would reap only modest
gains from further international pooling of risks, there is ittle doubt
that developing countries could benefit enormously.
Lucas (1987) proposed the thought experiment of eliminating the
variability of United States consumption around its trend path. For the
U.S. and for most other industrial countries, the aggregate or social
benefit this hypothetical event would confer is small—-far less than 1
percent of GNP per year in most cases. These small numbers are upper
bounds on the aggregate gains to industrial countries from international
risk sharing (absent dynamic investment effects).
Even the aggregate cost of consumption variability is significant
for most developing countries. For a representative sample, table 4 shows
the welfare gain per year from eliminating consumption variability,
expressed as a percent of annual consumption. The calculations use the
Summers—Heston (1991) data on per capita consumption and assume that the
natural logarithm of real per capita consumption follows a random walk
with trend. Consumers have generalized isoelastic utility functions with
40annual time discountfactors 0.95 (Lucas's number), relative risk
aversion coefficients of 1, and intertemporal substitution elasticities
of o.25.3'
Thenumbers in table 4 are based on a greater reduction in
consumption variability than would be feasible in reality. But they
suggest that for many developing countries, mechanisms to reduce
consumption risk—-such as increased access to world financial markets or
Shiller's (1993) proposed market in perpetual claims to national
GDPs--could yield a dramatic payoff.
4. The allocation of global investment
A well-functioning world capital market should direct investment
toward its most productive global uses. Economic efficiency requires that
the expected value of investment in any location be the same. The most
direct approach to evaluating efficiency would compare capital's rate of
return in different countries, but it is difficult to find
internationally comparable measures of the ex ante return to capital.
This section therefore focuses on two indirect approaches. One indirect
approach argues that capital should flow from countries where it is
relatively abundant to countries where it is relatively scarce. A second
indirect approach is based on an examination of countries' saving and
investment patterns.
31For details on the formulas used see Obstfeld (forthcoming, b). The
assumptions on time preference, risk aversion, and intertemporal
substitutability are conservative; more realistic assumptions would raise
the costs in table 4.
41Does capital flow to capital—poor countries?
In the simplest one—sector growth models, capital mobility ensures
that countries sharing a common technology will converge to identical
capital-output ratios. Figure 8 shows that for the two years 1973 and
1987, this equality was not even approximately true among the six OECD
countries for which Maddison (1991) has constructed comparable
capital-stock data. Moreover, there is very little tendency for
capital-output ratios to converge between 1973 and 1987. A
cross—sectional regression of the change in the log capital—output ratio
K/Y on the initial log capital—output ratio yields a small and
insignificant slope coefficient:




Aresuch persistent international differences in capital—output
ratios prima fade evidence of capital market failure? Suppose aggregate
output in a country is produced via the (possibly country—specific)




The marginal product of capital in this economy is
42MPK =K/Y
If countries' outputs are given by Cobb-Douglas production functions of
form (3), then even when those production functions differ in factor
productivities (the 6s) and in the array of noncapital inputs, their MPK
ratio equals the inverse of their relative capital-output ratio provided
only that they share a common value of ,capital'sshare in GDP.
This simple result has strong implications. Figure 8 suggests, for
example, that as of 1987, K/Y was around 1.9 for Japan but under 1.3 for
the United States. With a common a =1/3,the value suggested by Mankiw,
Romer, and Well (1992), the marginal product of capital would have been
17.4 percent in Japan, much below its value of more than 25.3 percent in
the United States. Under free capital mobility investment should have
been higher in the U.S. than in Japan; in reality the reverse was true.
If one applies this type of argument to compare returns to capital in
developed and developing countries (as do King and Rebelo 1993 and Lucas
1990), the discrepancies are even greater.
A pitfall in the preceding reasoning is the assumption of an
internationally common aggregate production function of form (3). If
there are multiple production activities with different capital
requirements, aggregate capital-output ratios can differ widely between
economies that pay the same factor rewards. Furthermore, factors could be
more substitutable in some activities (at least in the long run) than the
Cobb-Douglas form assumes. For example, capital substitutes for land in
some Japanese production activities that are carried out in the U.S. with
43more land andless capital.The evidence that a is a universal constant
is weak. Expected changes in relative prices will influence expected
returns. Finally, uncertainty is being ignored, If the productivity
coefficients 8 are stochastic and imperfectly correlated across
countries, we wouldn't expect to observe the same K/Y ratio everywhere:
more capital should be placed in countries where the payoff to investment
is most highly correlated with the marginal utility of world consumption.
Bardhan (1993) explores several models in which big international wage
discrepancies coexist with small differences in international returns to
capital.
Examination of countries' aggregate capital-output ratios cannot, in
itself, be informative about opportunities for efficiency-enhancing
international investment flows. A more convincing, albeit painstaking.
method is to evaluate sectoral rates of return directly, as in Minhas's
(1963) famous study. Little recent work along these lines is readily
available.
TheFeldstein-Hortokaapproach
As section 1 above described, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and
Feldstein (1983) proposed as a barometer of capital mobility the size of
the association between economies' savings rates and their investment
rates. They reasoned that in a world of capital mobility, each country's
savings are free to flow to their most productive uses anywhere in the
world——there is no reason for an increase in national saving necessarily
to augment the source country's domestic capital stock. These papers use
regressions of domestic investment rates on national savings rates to
44measure the fraction of an exogenous increase in national savings that
will remain at home, the "savings retention coefficient" as Feldstein and
Bacchetta (1991) call it. The saving-investment puzzle is to explain why
this coefficient appears to be high, even in recent data, despite the
high international capital mobility suggested by the evidence on
interest—rate links reviewed in section 2.
Informed policy decisions may depend on whether the
saving—investment puzzle really is explained by low capital mobility, or
by factors that simultaneously drive both saving and investment. For
example, under perfect capital mobility an increase in the government
deficit of a small economy need not crowd out domestic investment, even
if consumers do not behave according to the Ricardian equivalence
proposition: instead, foreign savings are available in perfectly elastic
supply to finance additional national borrowing. Feldstein and his
collaborators, in contrast, have interpreted their saving—investment
regressions as implying that any fall in national saving will, over the
long run, cause a commensurate fall in domestic investment, as in a
closed economy.
The Feldstein—Horioka approach raises two distinct questions. First,
is a close association between saving and investment in fact evidence of
low international capital mobility, as argued in the initial papers by
Feldstein and Horioka? Second, do regressions of investment on saving
actually measure the investment effect of an exogenous change in the
saving rate, for example, one caused by fiscal policy? These two
questions are inseparably linked: before the investment effect of a
change in national saving can be predicted, the precise mechanism
45underlying the estimated saving-investment association must be
understood. Because of space limitations, however, this survey will focus
on the first question, the relevance of the statistical saving—investment
32 relationship for assessing international capital mobility.
Cross-sectional versus time-series estimationIn answering this
question it is helpful to distinguish between two possible econometric
approaches to the estimation of saving-investment relationships.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) implemented a cross—sectional estimation
strategy. In this approach each observation consists of a country 's
average investment and saving rates over a given time period; the




where (IIY). is country 's average nominal investment rate out of
nominal GM' or GDP over the chosen time period, (SIY). is its average
saving rate over the same period, and u. is a random disturbance.
A second estimation strategy is based on time—series data. In this
approach each observation consists of a given country's investment and
saving rates over some time period t. The estimated regression equation
based on a time-series sample for a single country is
(I/Y) =
TS+ TS(s/y) + u
320bstfeld (1991) analyzes econometricpitfalls of using saving-investment
regressions to predict the effects of exogenous shifts in saving.
4633 (or the corresponding equation in first differences).
In a world of completely immobile capital, the error terms in (4)
and (5) represent measurement error and both estimation strategies yield
estimated slope coefficients near 1. More generally, however, the two
estimation strategies could yield quite different slope coefficients,
even when all countries are integrated into world capital markets to a
similar degree, because in (4) and TS in (5) measure very different
things.
Suppose, for example, that in the sample of N countries mean saving
rates have a high positive cross-sectional association with mean
investment rates, but that for each country, deviations of saving rates
from the time—series mean are uncorrelated with deviations of investment
rates from the time-series mean. Suppose also that the• cross—sectional
observations are country averages over T periods. Then the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimate 13CS will be high if T and N are sufficiently
large, but TS will be near zero for each country. If instead mean saving
rates and investment rates have a zero cross-sectional correlation, but
for each country, deviations from its mean saving and investment rates
tend to be close, (3 will be near zero for T and N sufficiently large
_'Ts. butthe estimates 13will be high.
The cross—sectional estimation strategy attempts to capture the
relationship between Long—runsavingand investment rates; for this
33Feldstein (1983) reports panel estimates that combin: the cross—section
and time-series strategies by assuming that 3 and 13areequal.
47strategy to succeed,each country'ssaving and investment rates must be
averaged over a sufficient interval to eliminate the influence of
short-run fluctuations around long-run means. The time-series estimation
strategy is meant to uncover the short—run relationship between national
saving and domestic investment. Both long-run and short-run relationships
are pertinent to an assessment of capital mobility. Explanations of the
time—series relationship between saving and investment will not, however,
throw much light on the cross-sectional relationship unless the time
period chosen for cross—sectional estimates is so brief that transitory
shocks to saving and investment swamp underlying long-run patterns.
Conversely, explanations of true long-run patterns may have little power
to explain short-run comovemerits.
Results of cross—sectional estimationFeldstein and Horioka (1980)
estimated (4) for a sample of 16 OECD countries, averaging annual data
over subperiods of l960-74. Data on gross saving and investment rates35




Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) provide an update; a typical estimate of
34Theircountry samplewas Australia,Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece,Ireland,Italy, Japan,theNetherlands, New
Zealand, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.
35Gross, rather than netrates, are more appropriate for this regression.
A regression in net rates imposes the assumption that all replacement
investment is financed by domestic savings.
48CS based on a sample of 23 OECD countries over the more recent period
1974-86 is 0.868 (witha standarderror of 0.145). a result quite close
36 to the original findings.This regression presents a much starker puzzle
about the international capital market than those based on 1960-74 data
because it is generally believed that the world capital market, while
relatively shallow and segmented prior to the early 1970s, has become
less regulated and expanded vigorously since then.37 Notwithstanding this
evolution, the Feldstein—Bacchetta findings still imply that a one
percent increase in the national saving rate remains cross—sectionally
associated with a nearly equal increase in the domestic investment rate.
A further update is provided in table 5, which presents the result
of estimating (4) for 22 OECD countries over subperiods of l974_90.38
Saving and investment rates are gross nominal flows divided by nominal
GDPorGNP.
The point estimates for 13CS in table 5 are lower than those that
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) report and somewhat lower, on the whole,
than those that Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) report. The R2statistics
are also below the ones in Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Figure 9 shows a
scatter plot for the 1981—90 data, together with the fitted regression
line.
36The countries are those listed in the previous footnote plus France,
Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
37See Marston (1993W for evidence on the 1960s.
38The countries are the Feldstein-Bacchetta sample less Turkey, which can
be classified as a developing country. Luxembourg traditionally is
omitted from this sample; it is such an extreme outlier that its addition
reduces the cross-sectional regression coefficient to insignificance.
49The results are suggestive of a decade—to—decade downward trend in
cs: the estimated coefficient over 1974-80, 0.867, has dropped to 0.636
by 1981—90. Such a trend, even if established, would be difficult to
interpret unambiguously. For example, the 1986-90 estimate of CS is
higher than that for 1981-85, yet one would not take this as evidence of
a decreasing degree of international capital mobility. The coefficient
differences are not significant in statistical terms.
The basic finding is that the positive cross—sectional association
between OECD saving and investment rates is economically and
statistically significant, although far from perfect and possibly
declining over time. Although the cross—sectional results are less
striking than those for 1960-74, they may present more of a puzzle given
the present level of industrial-country residents' participation in
international capital markets.39
Results for a wider sample including developing countries are not
reported, because there is less of a saving—investment puzzle as far as
those countries are concerned. Most of these countries even now control
capital flows and in some periods have faced binding external credit
constraints. Notwithstanding these tangible impediments to capital flow,
over the period from 1960 to the early 1980s (when the debt crisis
began), the cross—sectional association of saving and investment rates is
often found to be lower for the developing countries than for the OECD
40 countries.
39For documentation of thisactivity see, once again, Goldstein et a!.
(1993).
40See Fieleke (1982),Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson (1987), and Summers
50Results of time-series estimationTable 6 examines the time-series
properties of annual saving and investment rates over 1974-90 for the 22
countries that made up the cross-sectional sample, plus Luxembourg.
"Levels" estimates of TS comes from OLS estimation of (5) (with a time




Table7 reports the corresponding simple correlation coefficients between
linearly detrended and differenced saving and investment rates.
There is a wide dispersion of outcomes, a reflection not only of
different degrees of financial openness, but also of different country
sizes and the different shocks that have buffetted these diverse
economies. For most countries the saving and investment time series are
positively related, and typically the relationship is strong. Australia,
New Zealand, and Portugal all show positive time-series saving—investment
associations despite having run sizable current-acount deficits over
parts of the sample period. (Portugal's 1982 deficit was 13.5 percent of
GDP.) Norway, which did the same, shows a strongly negative relationship.
These findings underscore the point that annual time-series correlations
contain little information about the relationship between saving and
investment over long periods.4'
(1988).
41Observe that choice ofdetrending method can make a big difference (for
51Even under perfect capital mobility, positive regression
coefficients such as those reported in the table are not hard to explain.
If labor is internationally immobile, for example, positive shocks to
investment productivity can cause both investment and saving to rise
(Obstfeld 1986; Finn 1990; Tesar 1991; Ghosh, forthcoming). If the usual
outcome of such a shock is a current-account deficit, and if productivity
shocks are the dominant form of disturbance, then it would not be
surprising to find an estimate of Ts above 1, a result found for several
countries in table 6 but difficult to explain if capital is
internationally immobile. A positive time—series correlation between
saving and investment is reinforced if global as well as local shocks to
investment and saving are important (as Glick and Rogoff, 1993, find).42
Unlike the time series results, which can be rationalized in several
plausible ways, the cross-sectional finding that countries with higher
long-term saving rates also have higher long—term investment rates is
more difficult to explain in a world of capital mobility. The balance of
this section therefore focuses on alternative interpretations of the
cross—sectional saving—investment pattern as it persisted through the
1980s.
Explanations for the cross-sectional saving-investment relationship
Many researchers have taken the high estimates of 13CS in (4) as
example, the United Kingdom).
42Baxter and Crucini (1993), Cardia (1992), Mendoza (1991a, 1991b), and
Stockman and Tesar (1990) explore simulation models with perfect capital
mobility in which high time-series correlations between saving and
investment arise.
52evidence that national savings for the most part still are retained at
home and are not channeled toward their most efficient global uses by the
world capital market. Others have tried to approach the saving—investment
puzzle by identifying economic forces that underlie both saving and
investment and cause long—term averages of these two variables to move
together. A wide variety of mechanisms has been proposed.
Demographic factorsCharacteristics of a nation's labor force can
simultaneously affect national saving and the profitability of domestic
investment. Labor-force growth provides one example: higher growth can
raise national saving by increasing the ratio of young savers to old
dissavers; at the same time higher growth raises the investment needed to
keep the labor force equipped with capital (Black 1982; Obstfeld 1986).
Summers (1988) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) dismiss the
hypothesis that labor-force growth is "the" cause of the cross-sectional
saving-investment relationship. They show that the addition of growth
variables to the cross—sectional regression does not reduce the apparent
influence of saving on investment. Notwithstanding these regressions, it
remains quite plausible that labor—force developments are a part of the
story, more important in some countries than in others. Tesar (1991)
presents some evidence along these lines, showing that the fraction of
the population aged between 15 and 64 is positively related to both
saving and investment rates. The question deserves more detailed study.
Other potential links between household allocation decisions and
investment remain to be investigated. For example, are there systematic
links among fertility rates, saving, expenditures on schooling, and the
profitability of domestic investment?
53Real interest ratesEven if capital is perfectly mobile and
uncovered interest parity holds true, national real interest rates need
not be equal. Frankel (1986, 1993) claims that this point resolves the
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. The puzzle arises, he argues, because increases
in national saving depress the local real interest rate, spurring
investment and inducing a statistical correlation between saving and
investment rates.
While this mechanism may help us understand time—series correlations
between saving and investment rates, its bearing on the longer—run
cross—sectional patterns is less obvious. Under the conditions listed in
the last paragraph, the real interest differential between two countries
equals the expected percentage change in their currencies' real exchange
rate. If real interest effects are to explain the cross-sectional
regression results, countries with high saving and investment rates must
have low real interest rates and so their currencies must be conttnually
appreciating in real terms against foreign currencies.
Cardia (1992) describes a simulation model which is based on
Frankel's suggested mechanism, but which nonetheless may have some
explanatory power for the cross-sectional Feldstein-Horioka pattern. In
her model, adjustment to shocks can be drawn out over decades because of
capital-installation costs and an overlapping—generations population
structure. Although Cardia does not report cross-sectional simulations,
the long-lived effects of the disturbances she considers probably would
contribute to a strong cross— sectional association between long saving-
and investment-rate averages.
As Balass's (1964) work implies, models with different sectoral
54productivity growth rates can exhibit permanently trending real exchange
rates. This suggests another potential mechanism causing high-saving,
high-investment countries also to be countries with low real interest
rates. Imagine a small-open economy producing traded and nontraded goods
using capital (which is internationally mobile) and labor (which is not).
Assume that initially all countries are identical. Consider the effect of
a permanent increase in traded-goods productivity growth in one economy.
The currency of this economy will begin to appreciate in real terms
at a higher rate, its real interest rate will fall, and its investment
rate will rise. Saving, which depends on the real interest rate, also
will change. If the average domestic intertemporal substitution
elasticity is below 1 (as several empirical studies suggest), the fall in
the real interest rate will cause saving to rise (and the rate of total
real expenditure growth to fall). Saving and investment thus will tend to
show a positive cross-sectional correlation, seemingly driven by
cross—country real interest rate differences but really driven by
differences in traded-goods productivity growth.43
No one has yet established a robust cross—sectional relationship
among saving, investment, the real interest rate, and the real exchange
rate's expected path. Mechanisms such as the one described thus remain
speculative.
431n general, when aneconomy has several sectors of differing capital
intensity, some of which produce nontraded goods, there is no longer a
presumption that the economy's consumption side and its production side
(including investment) can be analyzed separately, even under capital
mobility. This point is made through various examples by Murphy (1986),
Engel and Kletzer (1989), and Wong (1990).
55Hysteresis of factor suppliesResults presented above (figure 8)
show that OECD countries are characterized by wide and persistent
differences in capital—output ratios. This pattern suggests another
possible explanation for the saving—investment puzzle.
European countries entered the postwar era burdened by external
payments controls and limited access to foreign resources. For some time,
therefore, countries had to finance most of their capital accumulation
through domestic savings. High-saving countries accumulated large capital
stocks and specialized in capital-intensive industries, while low-saving
countries ended up producing a more labor-intensive product mix.
The subsequent liberalization of capital movements need not have
disturbed this production pattern greatly. In the presence of labor-force
growth, however, high-capital countries required high investment rates to
maintain their established industries, while low-capital countries could
get by with lower investment rates. Since the high-capital countries also
were those with high saving rates, a high cross—sectional correspondence
between saving and investment rates was the result. On this view, the
historical accident of capital immobility during the first part of the
postwar period had an effect on the distribution of national investment
rates that persisted even after capital mobility returned.
If the preceding interpretation is valid, countries with higher
saving and investment rates should have higher shares of capital income
in GDP. Mankiw, Romer, and \Veil (1992)argue,however, that this is not
the case and that in fact there is little international variation in
56capital's GDP share.44 Their argument, based on limited data from the
1960s and 1970s, contradicts Kaldor's (1961) fifth 'stylized fact" of
economic growth: "A high correlation between the share of profits in
income and the share of investment in output" (p. 178). More research on
this point would be useful.
Corporate financing frictions The need for firms facing imperfect
domestic capital markets to finance investment out of corporate savings
has been suggested as another explanation of the Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle. But is a tight link between corporate saving and investment
enough to produce a tight link between national saving and investment? A
dollar rise in corporate saving may raise domestic investment if firms
are borrowing-constrained, but it will raise national saving only if
shareholders fail to pierce the corporate veil and adjust their own total
saving downward by a dollar. The largest corporations, moreover, do not
face binding finance constraints.
A related hypothesis concerns the possibility that domestic and
foreign residents value domestic equities differently, as generally is
the case in the absence of efficient consumption risk—sharing among
countries. (Dooley, F'rankel, and Mathieson, 1987, examine a polar case in
which claims to domestic physical capital are nontradable.) In this
situation, domestic saving and investment could be correlated, even for a
small country, despite perfect international arbitrage in bonds. Can this
type of equity-market segmentation help explain the cross-sectional
44This pattern would be consistent with a world in which national outputs
are produced according to (3) (withthe same in all countries) and
capital is internationally immobile.
57saving—investment results? One obvious approach would be look for a
negative cross-sectional correlation between the cost of capital and the
saving rate in industrialcountries.45
The general point is that strict domesticsegmentationof financial
markets could generate a saving—investment relationship.
Country-by-country empirical documentation for this mechanism has not yet
been produced.
Government policies Systematic current-account targeting by
governments would, if successful, tend to produce a strong
cross—sectional saving investment association, even with high capital
mobility (Fieleke 1982; Summers 1988). Fiscal and monetary policy, as
well as capital controls, have all been used to limit the sizes of
current-account imbalances. There is some evidence that government
policies in a number of countries have aimed to curtail external
imbalances (Artis and Bayoumi 1989), but it is difficult to judge how
well these policies succeeded. It is also possible that government
policies aimed at domestic stabilization or international reserve
management have effects similar to current—account targeting.
If capital mobility is high, however, there may be less reason for a
government to target the current account than if capital mobility is low:
economy—wide credit constraints that private agents may fail to
internalize are less stringent. On the other hand, governments trying to
fix currency exchange rates in the face of speculative pressure may well
45mere is some evidence of such a relationship in the past; see McCauley
and Zimmer (1989). However, it is hard to disentangle the effect of
saving from the effect of tax provisions that simultaneously affect
saving and the cost of capital.
58take actions that limit current account imbalances.
The economy's intertemporal budget constraint An open economy
faces an intertemporal budget constraint relating the difference between
its saving and investment——the current account--to the change in its net
external assets. Under some economic conditions this constraint alone
implies that saving and investment ratios averaged over sufficiently long
periods must be close despite capital mobility.46
To appreciate this point, let At denote a given country's nominal
net foreign assets at the end of period t and recall the current-account
identity's implication that At —At_i
=S
— Supposethat the data
are average saving and investment rates over T periods. Let at =At/Ytbe
the ratio of external assets to income and= — thegrowth
rate of nominal income. Then the current-account identity implies that
the difference between the averaged saving and investment rates is48
TS —I TA —A
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46SeeObstfeld (1986, p. 73), Sinn (1992) and Vikøren (1991).
47This relation will not hold exactly in the data becausesaving as
measured by national income and product accounts does not include capital
gains or losses on foreign assets (see Obstfeld 1986).
48The income growth rates below are nominal rather than real rates because
the national income and product account concept of saving does not
correct income for the inflationary erosion of nominal assets' real
values.
5911 = — a0+ + ... + g2a1 + g1a0
In principle, the foregoing identity alone places no constraints on
the average difference between saving and investment rates. Suppose,
however, that there is a steady—state ratio of net foreign assets to
income from which the economy does not greatly diverge between the start
and end of the sample period. Then if nominal income growth is moderate,
(6) implies that the averaged difference between saving and investment
rates may well be small.Mature economies may have attained a
stationary distribution of the foreign assets/GNP ratio; the
intertemporal trade gains that arise between mature economies generally
will be transitory and their distribution symmetical.49 This conjecture
may help explain why even in the late 1980s a fairly high cross-sectional
saving—investment relation persisted for the industrial countries. The
conjecture also explains why, before the debt crisis of the 1980s,
developing countries displayed lower cross—sectional saving—investment
correlations than developed. Developing countries with significant
unexploited investment opportunities have external debts well below their
steady—state levels. This perspective suggests that ultimately, the
cross-sectional saving—investment correlation within a group of countries
49An exception is Norway, which borrowed abroad so heavily during the
1970s to develop its oil production that by 1978 its foreign debt/GDP
ratio stood near 60 percent (Vikøren 1991). Even Norway repaid this debt
quickly: by 1985 the country's net foreign debt stood at around 12
percent of GDP, its 1970 level. The United States current account
deficit, driven by goverment deficits and demographic shifts, is another
exception.
60with open capital markets depends on the extent of each one's long—term
intertemporal trade gains with other countries. Attempts to assess these
gains (as in Ghosh, forthcoming, and Glick and Rogoff 1993) are critical
for understanding how puzzling the saving-investment puzzle really is.
Comparisons with the gold standard and with regional data
An indirect way to judge whether the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle
reflects true capital immobility or some subset of the alternative
factors listed above is to examine the strength of the cross-sectional
saving—investment association in settings of presumed capital mobility.
Data from the gold-standard period and regional data have both been used
for this purpose.
The saving-investment relation under the gold standardTable 8
reports results for three data samples. The first consists of Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the U.K., and
the U.S. with data averaged over 1880-1913. The second sample adds Japan,
using data averaged over 1885-99 and 1900-13. The third sample, based on
1926-38 data, subtracts France but adds Finland, which gained
independence from Russia in 1917. 1 first discuss the pre—1914 results,
which fall under the classical gold standard.5°
Over 1880—1913, the estimated regression coefficient 13CS is almost
significant (with a one-tailed test) and not too different from the
estimates in table 5 based on data from the 1980s. (The R2 is, however,
50For details on data construction, see Jones and Obstfeld (1994).
61much lower in table 8). Over 1885-99 the estimateis the same but
significant. For the 1900—13 period (with data pictured in figure 10),
the coefficient rises to 0.77, but loses significance.51
To the extent that the classical gold standard was a period of high
international financial integration, the pre-1914 findings in table 8 and
figure 10 suggest that the recent long-run behavior of saving and
investment rates is not inconsistent with substantial capital mobility.
True, the dispersion of saving and investment rates during the gold
standard is greater than among industrial countries over the 1980s; and
among the largest economies we now see nothing like the surpluses the
U.K. persistently ran. Three factors should be considered, however, in
assessing capital mobility under the classical gold standard and
comparing it with curent conditions. First, as Nurkse (1954) emphasized,
international capital movements were abetted by complementary large-scale
labor movements from Europe into regions of recent (white) settlement.
Nothing like the level of migration seen then has occurred in the postwar
era.52 Second, the inclusion of Australia and Canadameans that devioping-
and developed-country data are being pooled, a procedure that would
loosen the saving-investment association in modern data. Finally,
Britain's close cultural and political ties with some borrowers certainly
facilitated its large—scale foreign lending. As is evident from figure
51Bayoumi (1990) finds no cross—sectional saving-investment association
for a smaller eight—country sample over any subperiod of 1880-1913.
Eichengreen (1990) amends Bayoumi's data and adds the United States. The
results in table 8 are very similar to Eichengreen's, despite my use of
different data for some countries and an expanded set of countries.
52See Razin and Sadka (1993) for a recent discussion of international
labor mobility.
6210, Canada and the U.K. are behind the poor fit of the 1900-13
regression.
Table 8 also reports a regression for the interwar period following
the (short—lived) reinstatement of the international gold-standard,
1926-38; the data are displayed in figure 11. The results stand in the
sharpest possible contrast to those for the classical gold standard, and
show a stronger saving-investment association even than the 1960-74
Feldstein-Horioka results. Eichengreen (1990) discusses possible reasons
for this contrast, which are complex but seem related to a genuine
post-World War! decline in capital mobility. One factor behind this
decline was the rise of the political Left. This development made
international investors less secure in their property rights than they
were before 1914. It also focused the attention of policymakers on
domestic economic problems at the expense of laissez-faire principles of
international economic relations.
During the classical gold-standard era governments practiced less
pervasive management of their economies than afterward. Do the results of
this section therefore show that the hypothesis of current—account
targeting is not needed to explain the current cross—sectional
saving-investment relation? Not at all. Even under the gold standard,
some governments may have curtailed current-account imbalances as a side
effect of actions taken to maintain gold convertibility, or in pursuit of
foreign policy aims.
Regional saving-investment linksThe use of regional saving and
investment data is a potentially fruitful way to throw light on the
6353
saving—investment puzzle.Bayoumi and Rose (forthcoming) construct
saving and investment data for 11 British regions over 1971-85; they find
no significant positive cross-sectional relationship between saving and
investment rates. Bayoumi and Sterne (1993) find a similar result for
Canadian provinces. Sinn (1992). who looks at both 1953 and 1957 data for
the 48 U.S. states and Alaska, finds a negative cross-sectional
relationship between saving and investment rates. Data over 1975-88 on
average saving and investment rates for the 45 Japanese prefectures
listed in table 3 are graphed in figure 12. Again, no positive
relationship is apparent.
The data used in these calculations aren't always ideal. For
example, Bayoumi and Rose have data for only part of regional expenditure
and investment. More seriously, Bayoumi and his coauthors define saving
as regional GDP less a regional consumption measure, not as GNP less that
measure. Thus, these measures of saving fail to include in income not
only net interest and dividend payments from outside the region, but also
net transfers from the domestic central government and others. The much
greater dispersion of saving than investment rates in figure 12 raises
suspicions that measurement errors are a problem in the Japanese saving
data shown there, despite their definition as prefecture GNP less
consumption.
There are, moreover, differences between regions and countries that
53Murphy (1984) applied a similar idea to the 143 largest industrial
corporations from the 1981 Fortune 500. He found a significant
cross—sectional relation between corporate saving and investment. It
would be interesting to know if this relationship has held up in view of
financial-market developments since the early 1980s.
64might weaken the saving-investment link. The comparative ease with which
labor can migrate between regions could alter the response of regional
saving and investment to disturbances. (This is especially possible in
Japan, where commuting between prefectures is significant.) Furthermore,
regions within countries tend to be more specialized in their production
activities than are countries themselves. Thus, some of the shocks that
can make national saving and domestic investment move together may not
induce similar comovements in regional saving and investment.
The strength of factors such as these is unknown at present. Until
more work is done and better data assembled, the regional
saving-investment regressions provide the most persuasive evidence that
national boundaries or policies placed limits on industrial—country
current-account imbalances through the 1980s.
Since regional current accounts are not objects of government
policy, the regional results leave current—account targeting as a prime
suspect behind the cross-sectional saving—relationship that has persisted
in international data. The results are also consistent with the view that
capital is still not as mobile between as within countries.
5. Conclusion
The main conundrum in thinking about international capital mobility
is to reconcile measures of mobility that superficially contradict each
other. How can one square the generally smooth international
interest-rate arbitage documented in section 2 with the low international
consumption correlations and home portfolio bias discussed in section 3
or the still-sizable cross-sectional coherence between saving and
65investment documented in section 4? In this paper I have reviewed a
number of economic models and data limitations that potentially can
contribute to a reconciliation. Despite years of research, however,
economists still have not reached the semblance of a consensus on which
factors are most relevant. Much work remains to be done; hopefully, the
rapid evolution of world capital markets, if not braked by renewed
regulation, will furnish more clues as well as data.
After such a a lengthy and arduous trek through the literature, I
owe the reader more, however, than just a plea for more of the same. So
here are my tentative conclusions.
I-low mobile is capital in the world economy? As far as industrial
countries are concerned, capital mobility appears substantial when judged
by the measure of past experience, such as the classical gold-standard
era. I have not presented as thorough a review of developing country
experience in this paper, because that experience is diverse and the
market access of many developing countries is currently in flux. It is
clear, however, that most of the developing world still stands outside
the nexus of industrial—country financial markets.
Capital mobility appears noticeably lower between industrial
economies than it is within them, although intereconomy capital mobility
certainly has increased over time. The threat of government intervention
in coss-border capital movements has not disappeared. (Indeed, in the
wake of the August 1993 ERM collapse, European Commission President
Jacques Delors signaled his support of concerted EC measures to limit
66capital mobility.54) Financial flows apparently are less extensive between
than within countries. International portfolio diversification appears
inexplicably limited for some major countries. And long-run saving and
investment rates remain positively associated in international cross
sections to an extent greater than is true in the (usually imperfect)
regional data that are available. This last phenomenon could reflect
central government policies that have the effect of limiting national
current—account imbalances.
It is doubtful that capital will ever be as mobile between nations
as it can be within them. The mere existence of national governments
sovereign within their borders means that no investor can think about
domestic and foreign assets in quite the same way. What is at issue,
then, is the extent to which actual conditions approximate free capital
mobility. Among industrial countries the approximation has become better
and better in recent years, but it still has some ways to go.
54. •1 . . •1 SeeReturn of Capital Controls Raised by Delors, Financial TLmes,
September 16, 1993, p. 1.
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Domestic interbank versus Eurocurrency three—month interest rates:
Daily data, January 1, 1982—April 30, 1993 (in basis points)
A.France
F £ -F -E F —E E -F OnshoreOffshore
Period 1 —i 1 —i 1 —i 1 —i
—Fr—Fr Fr Fr—Fr Fr —Fr Fr ask-bidask—bid
Jan.1, 1982- —227 —254 —267 214 13 40
Jan. 31, 1987 (336) (375) (375) (336) (3) (49)
Feb. 1. 1987— —11 —10 —23 —2 13 13
June 30, 1990 (16) (20) (19) (17) (4) (10)
July 1, 1990— 8 1 —11 —20 12 19
May31, 1992 (7) (11) (7) (10) (8) (5)
June1,1992- —1. —3 —35 —32 32 34
AprIl30,1993 (34) (40) (45) (36) (20) (38)
B. Italy
IE —I -E .1 -E E -I OnshoreOffshore
Period !L1LI 1L11L1 !L1'LjL11Li ask-bidask-bid
Jan.1, 1982— —50 —89 —124 15 34 74
Jan. 31, 1987 (262) (311) (308) (265) (10) (57)
Feb. 1, 1987— 29 48 —14 —91 62 43
June 30, 1990 (48) (47) (49) (47) (20) (7)
July 1, 1990— 56 63 9 —111 55 47
May 31, 1992 (29) (36) (29) (37) (24) (6)
June 1, 1992— 36 28 —8 —73 36 45
April 30, 1993 (49) (50) (43) (62) (42) (33)Table 1 (continued)
C. Germany
CE -G -E G -E E -G OnshoreOffshore Period !DM—DM 1DM'DM !DM—1DM !DM1DM ask-bidask-bid
Jan. 1, 1982— 17 16 5 —28 11 13
Jan. 31. 1987 (17) (17) (18) (16) (4) (3)
Feb. 1, 1987— 5 3 —8 —15 10 13
June 30, 1990 (10) (10) (11) (10) (2) (3)
July 1, 1990— —5 —5 —18 —8 13 13
May 31, 1992 (9) (8) (9) (8) (2) (1)
June 1, 1992— 7 5 —6 —18 11 13
April 30, 1993 (13) (12) (12) (13) (2) (2)
D. Japan
J E -J-E .J—E £ -J OnshoreOffshore Period 1 —1 1 —1 i—iI —i
—v-Y V V —Y V -Y V ask-bidask-bid
Jan.1, 1982— —7 na —20 na na 13
Jan. 31, 1987 (28) (28) (4)
Feb. 1, 1987— -60 na —68 na na 8
June 30, 1990 (33) (33) (3)
July 1, 1990- 9 na 2 na na 7
May 31, 1992 (37) (37) (3)
June 1, 1992— 17 na 10 na na 7
April 30, 1993 (19) (19) (2)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Subscripts denote asset
currency of denomination (Fr =franc,Li =lira,DM =deutschemark,
V =yen);superscripts denote asset location (E =LondonEurocurrency market,
F =France,I =Italy,G =Germany,JJapan). Overbars denote ask Interest
rates (the rates at which banks lend funds), underbars bid Interest rates
(the rates banks pay on deposits). Data are daily except for weekends and
holidays.Table 2
Consumption and output correlations:

























BELGIUM 0.50 0.47 0.66 0.49 0.58
DENNARJ< 0.09 —0.04 0.75 0.60 0.39
FRANCE 0.26 0.41 0.64 0.50 0.56
GERMANY —0.11 0.31 0.78 0.72 0.87
GREECE —0.10 0.03 0.69 0.13 0.41
IRELAND 0.58 0.58 0.77 0.48 0.57
ITALY —0.02 0.35 0.62 0.27 0.61
LUXEMBOURG 0.14—0.18 0.20 0.21 0.73
NETHERLANDS 0.49 0.27 0.77 0.56 0.59
PORTUGAL —0.10 0.18 0.55 0.06 0.44
SPAIN —0.33 0.01 0.90 0.32 0.39
U.K. 0.29 0.49 0.60 0.59 0.66
Others
AUSTRALIA 0.39 0.06 0.88
AUSTRIA 0.33 0.27 0.59
CANADA 0.43 0.42 0.71
FINLAND 0.20 0.34 0.82
ICELAND 0.17 —0.18 0.91
JAPAN 0.06 0.43 0.57
NEW ZEALAND 0.38 -0.07 0.81
NORWAY 0.36 0.01 0.56
SWEDEN 0.27 0.07 0.74






































































GUATEMALA —0.28 —0.40 0.81 0.39 0.48 0.95
HONDURAS 0.16 0.20 0.58 0.54 0.68 0.91
INDIA —0.13 —0.09 0.59—0.13—0.16 0.93
KENYA —0.04 0.24 0.93—0.08 0.20 0.82
MEXICO —0.01 0.22 0.92—0.27 0.02 0.98
MOROCCO —0.18—0.05 0.94 0.22 —0.04 0.62
PARAGUAY 0.13—0.21 0.78—0.32 0.01 0.93
PAKISTAN 0.03 0.33 0.59—0.20 0.06 0.44
PERU 0.11 0.35 0.60—0.26—0.18 0.94
PHILIPPINES 0.03—0.15 0.77—0.06—0.12 0.80
SOUTH AFRICA 0.39 0.20 0.85—0.49—0.10 0.88
THAILAND —0.27—0.23 0.94 0.51 0.61 0.84
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO —0.20—0.09 0.69—0.30—0.33 0.95
TURKEY —0.13 0.21 0.96 0.06—0.18 0.86
URUGUAY 0.17 0.42 0.95 0.09 0.28 0.90
Note: The numbers p(,t?') [or p(2,291)) are simple correlation
coefficients between the annual change in the natural logarithm of
the country's real per capita consumption (or output) and the
annual change in the natural logarith!n of the rest of the world's
real per capita consumption (or output), with the "world" defined
as the sample listed in the table. National per capita consumptions
and outputs were calculated using variables 1, 3, and 6 listed in
appendix A.l of Summers and Heston (1991). The numbers p(O,) are
correlations between each country's log consumption per capita and
log output per capita changes.Table 3
Consumption and income correlations by prefecture:
Japanese data, 1975—88
Preftcrure p('&t')p(9,9')p(ê,9) Prefecture p('ê,t')p(9,9')p(&9)
Hokkaido0.595 0.165 0.339 Kyoto 0.682 0.149 0.778
Aomori —0.096 0.196 0.905 Osaka 0.719 0.053 0.776
Miyagi 0.750 0.555 0.420 Hyogo 0.480 —0.000 0.742
Akita 0.219 0.433 0.367 Nara 0.181 0.766 —0.211
Yamagata0.496 0.303 0.748 Wakayaina0.136 0.105 0.455
Fukushima 0.065 0.386 0.898 Tottori 0.413 0.858 0.491
Ibaraki 0.077 0.205 0.630 Shimane 0.170 0.551 0.717
Tochigi 0.100 0.115 —0.589 Okayaina 0.245 0.103 —0.568
Gunma 0.644 0.668 0.444 Hiroshima 0.661 0.075 0.736
Saitama 0.404 0.337 0.696 Yamaguchi 0.777 0.331 —0.201
Chiba 0.547 0.267 0.693 Tokushima 0.313 0.613 0.705
Tokyo 0.238 0.055 0.978 Kagawa 0.610 0.494 0.555
Kanagawa0.240 —0.015 0.872 Ehime 0.277 0.215 0.577
Yamanashi 0.658 0.513 0.567 Kochi 0.070 0.122 0.115
Nagano 0.252 0.358 —0.474 Fukuoka 0.319 0.123 0.569
Shizuoka0.297 0.415 0.081 saga 0.505 0.534 0.913
Toyama 0.098 0.232 —0.713 Nagasaki —0.218 0.254 0.704
Ishikawa0.723 0.380 0.764 Kumamoto0.059 0.221 0.907
Gifu 0.258 0.423 —0.313 Oita —0.020 0.096 0.537
Aichi 0.349 —0.004 —0.265 Miyazaki0.010 0.528 0.824
Mie 0.039 0.211 —0.618 Kagoshima 0.046 0.218 0.982
Fukui 0.012 —0.106 0.849 Okinawa—0.249 0.036 0.949
Shiga 0.625 0.602 —0.142
Note: The numbers p(O,c') [or p(p,9')] are simple correlation
coefficients between the annual change in the natural logarithm of
the prefecture's real per capita consumption (or income) and the
annual change in the natural logarithm of the other 44 prefectures'
average real per capita consumption (or income). The numbers p(,p)
are correlations between prefecture log consumption per capita and
log income per capita changes. Data supplied by Robert Dekie.Table 4
Gains from the elimination of consumption variability:
Selected developing countries

















Note:The calculations assume that the logarithm of per capita consumption
follows a random walk with trend and that individuals have
generalized isoelastic utility functions with annual time discount
factor 0.95, relative risk aversion parameter 1, and intertemporal
substitution elasticity 0.25.Data are taken from Sumeera and
Heaton (1991).For details on the calculation see Obetfeld
(forthcoming).Table 5


















Note:Estimates of equation (4) in text.Standard errors appear in
parentheses below estimates of slope coefficient .Thesampleof
22 countries consists ofAustralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland,Prance, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, NewZealand,Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.Table 6
























United Kingdom 0.113 1.002
United States 0.848 1.090
Note: Levele estimates arebasedon the OLS regression
(I/Y)t a +(S/Y)+yt+u,"differences" estimates on the
OLS regression A(I/Y) —+ 5A(S/Y)+Au.Table 7
Time—eeries correlation coefficients between saving and investment rates:
Annual data, 1974—90






















United Kingdom 0.092 0.668
United States 0.773 0.895
Note: teve].5" estimates are simple correlation coefficients between
(I/Y)and (S/Y)t, where bothvariables arelinearly detrended.
"Differences" estimates arecorrelationcoefficients between
A(I/Y) andt(S/Y)t.Table 8
Cross—sectionalregressions of investment rates on saving rates during














Note:Estimates of equation (4) in text.Standard errors appear in
parentheses below estimates of slope coefficient .The1880—1913
sample consists of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Sweden, the U.X., and the U.S. The 1885—99 and 1900—
13 samples add Japan. The 1926—38 sample subtracts France and adds
Finland.